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Taking Federalism Seriously: Limiting
State Acceptance of National Grants
Federalism was one of the central structural principles guiding the
Framers of the Constitution, and it remains central to our interpretation
of that document today.' Because Federalism is a system of allocating
power between the state and national governments, its vitality depends on
the policing of their respective spheres of authority. A number of explicit
safeguards in the Constitution prevent the states from encroaching upon
the authority of the national government.' The Supreme Court, however,
has permitted erosion of corresponding safeguards of state authority. The
Court has removed virtually all internal limits3 on national power by
abandoning the practice of strictly construing the powers delegated to the
national government. In an effort to preserve Federalism, the Court, in
National League of Cities v. Useryl developed a set of external limits on
national power. That decision, however, applies only to direct regulation
of the states. While direct regulation is limited, indirect regulation, carried
out through conditions placed upon national grants to the states, has in-
creasingly served as a vehicle for national control of the states.'
1. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44-45 (1971). For a discussion of the differences between the
Framers' definition of Federalism and the modern definition, see Diamond, What the Framers Meant
by Federalism, in A NATION OF STATES 25 (R. Goldwin ed. 1974), and Diamond, Commentaries on
The Federalist: The Federalist on Federalism: "Neither a National Nor a Federal Constitution, But a
Composition of Both," 86 YALE L.J. 1273 (1977). The distinction is a semantic one, for the Framers
considered a "federal" government to be a mere confederation of sovereign states and a "national"
government to be a unitary government. They believed they had created a "composition of both." THE
FEDERALIST NO. 39 at 250 (J. Madison) (E. Earle ed. 1937). That "composition" has come to be
known as Federalism. Diamond, What the Framers Meant By Federalism, supra, at 27-28.
2. The most crucial of these is the supremacy clause:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in pursuance
thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United
States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound
thereby; any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.
U.S. CONST. art. VI, d. 2.
3. Internal limits on power operate by limiting the extent of the delegated power. External limits
operate by creating zones into which the power may not reach. Thus, construing a grant of power
narrowly is a method of limiting power internally, while the promulgation of a Bill of Rights is a
method of limiting power externally.
4. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
5. See pp. 1695-97 infra.
The Reagan administration has proposed replacing many grants that carry extensive conditions
with unconditional "block" grants. 39 CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP. 708, 708-10 (1981). While the admin-
istration's public opposition to extensive conditions on grants to states may prevent new programs
from being approved, it is unlikely to lead to a real reduction in the use of conditions to achieve
national policy goals. The administration has proposed conditions of its own, see, e.g., id. at 450
(proposed "workfare' requirement for Aid to Families with Dependant Children), and it is quite
possible that conditions of one sort will simply be replaced by conditions of another. In July of 1981,
most of the administration's block grant proposals were defeated in spite of its overall budget success.
1694
Conditional Grants
This Note argues that the doctrine currently controlling conditional
grants is incapable of preserving the legitimate interests of the states. Cur-
rent internal and external limits on national power provide no check on
the conditions placed upon those grants, enabling the national government
to invade almost any area of state power at will. In order to limit national
infringement of legitimate state interests, the Note proposes a doctrine es-
tablishing a zone of power belonging exclusively to the states and a consti-
tutional requirement that the states make all policy decisions on matters
within this zone free from the influence of the national government. The
Note argues that because national use of conditional grants to influence
state policy often impinges on exclusive state powers, a state's acceptance
of such grant conditions constitutes a failure to make such an uninfluenced
decision. The Note concludes that state acceptance of such conditions is
therefore unconstitutional, and provides examples of conditions it would
be unconstitutional for a state to accept.
I. Conditional Funding
Currently, the most popular vehicle for national regulation of state pol-
icies is the conditional grant to state governments.' Such grants pose a
serious threat to the continuing vitality of Federalism, yet current doctrine
is incapable of dealing with the problem.
A. The Conditional Grant System
National grants to state governments now constitute approximately one-
quarter of total state and local budgets,' and the conditions that are at-
tached to those grants reach far into areas traditionally within the scope of
state power.' National conditions, for example, have required that states
See id. at 1390. Even if the administration is eventually successful in ending conditional grants, it is
doubtful that the victory will stand the test of time. Representatives and Senators as well as Presidents
are unlikely over the long run to pay the bill for state-run programs without taking an active role in
the planning and administration of those programs.
6. This is so because direct regulation has been severely limited. See National League of Cities v.
Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976) (unconstitutional to apply minimum wage to states); District of Columbia
v. Train, 521 F.2d 971, 990-95 (D.C. Cir. 1975), vacated and remanded per curiam sub nom. EPA v.
Brown, 431 U.S. 99 (1977) (unconstitutional to require states to adopt provisions of national environ-
mental program). But see Pennsylvania v. EPA, 500 F.2d 246 (3rd Cir. 1974) (constitutional to
require stales to adopt provisions of national enviromental regulatory program). If direct regulations
that invade state prerogatives were not unconstitutional, the states would hold those powers at the
sufferance of the national government, and Federalism would be a dead letter.
7. U.S. ADVISORY COMM'N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, AN AGENDA FOR AMERICAN
FEDERALISM: RESTORING CONFIDENCE AND COMPETENCE 3 (1981) (series title: "The Federal Role in
the Federal System: The Dynamics of Growth").
8. See U.S. ADVISORY COMM'N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, SUMMARY AND CONCLUD-
ING OBSERVATIONS 66 (1978) (series title: "The Intergovernmental Grant System: An Assessment and
Proposed Policies"); pp. 1715-16 infra.
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adopt nationally approved regional sewage treatment plans,9 nationally
designed programs for regulating health industries, 10 and nationally au-
thorized plans to limit air pollution." Conditions such as these promote
policies closely related to the goals of the national grant. An increasing
number of conditions, however, impose requirements unrelated to the
goals of the grants to which they are attached. 2 These conditions reach
such matters as state political procedures, t3 hiring practices,14 and pro-
curement policies.'"
The Framers of the Constitution could not have contemplated that the
national government would use conditional grants to influence the states'
exercise of their powers to the extent that is now possible, for in their time
even the most expansive interpretations of the spending power 6 held it to
be limited by the words "general welfare" to matters of national, not lo-
cal, concern. 7 Indeed, until the New Deal, national grants to the states
were quite limited," and imposed few conditions. It was not until the
1960s that the overall tenor of national grants shifted from assisting the
states in achieving their own goals to using the states as instruments to
achieve national goals.20 State dependence on national funding grew as
states attempting to raise their own funds for social programs found it
impossible to raise taxes without risking damage to their economies and
emigration of middle class taxpayers.2'
9. 33 U.S.C.A. § 1288 (West 1978 & Supp. 1981).
10. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 300m to 300m-2 (West Supp. 1981).
11. 42 U.S.c. §§ 7501-7508 (Supp. 111 1979).
12. U.S. ADVISORY COMM'N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, CATEGORICAL GRANTS:
THEIR ROLE AND DESIGN 234 (1978) (series title: "The Intergovernmental Grant System: An Assess-
ment and Proposed Policies") [hereinafter cited as ACIR REPORT].
13. Id. at 259.
14. The Davis-Bacon Act requires that an employer pay "prevailing wages." 40 U.S.C. §§ 276a
to 276a-5 (1976). Its provisions have been made applicable to some state programs through conditions
on national grants. ACIR REPORT, supra note 12, at 255; see, e.g., 49 U.S.C. § 1609(a) (1976) (mass
transit programs). The Urban Mass Transit Act requires that states provide special protections and
privileges to transit workers. Id. § 1609(c).
15. The Federal Procurement Policy Act of 1974, as amended, provides for the conditioning of
national grants on state adoption of nationally designed procurement policies. 41 U.S.C. § 405 (1976
& Supp. 111 1979). The Office of Management and Budget has adopted procurement guidelines ap-
plicable to the states in their use of national grants. See OMB Circular No. A-102, Attachment 0
(1981) (on file with Yale Law Journal).
16. "The Congress shall have Power . . . to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence
and general Welfare of the United States . . . ." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, ci. 1.
17. See United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 65-67 (1936) (discussing Framers' intent).
18. See W. GRAVES, AMERICAN INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS 477-526 (1964). Prior to the
1930s, national grants went mainly for road and canal building, agricultural education and research,
and colleges. Id. In 1915 national cash grants totaled only $5 million; between World War I and the
New Deal they amounted to only $100 million annually. M. REAGAN & J. SANZONE, THE NEW
FEDERALISM 55 (2d ed. 1981).
19. See M. REAGAN & J. SANZONE, supra note 18, at 56 ("substantial federal supervision" began
in 1930s).
20. J. SUNDQuIST, MAKING FEDERALISM WORK 1-3 (1969).
21. See Rockefeller, Revenue Sharing-A View From the Statehouse, 60 GEO. L.J. 45, 48-51
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As their dependence on national funds has grown, states have seen the
conditions under which they receive those funds become increasingly re-
strictive.22 Thus the doctrine controlling the national government's power
to set conditions has taken on new importance.
B. Present Limits On Conditional Grants
Present doctrine purports to determine the constitutionality of condi-
tions on national grants on a case-by-case basis, by examining whether the
recipient state is being coerced. Although the leading case on the question,
Steward Machine Co. v. Davis,23 provides no clear standard, 24 the most
persuasive interpretation of the case is that it adopts a two-tiered test.25
First, the expenditure and the condition attached to it must be "reasona-
bly related to a legitimately national end," and second, the state must be
induced, not coerced, into accepting the condition. 26
The first tier of the test is enfeebled by the absence of internal limits on
congressional power to spend.27 The test is thus limited to the question
whether the condition itself is reasonably related to a legitimate national
end. The condition need not, however, be justified in its own right. It need
only be justified as a part of the overall expenditure program, because any
condition relating to the purpose of the program is in the general welfare
if the program is in the general welfare. No matter how much a condition
intrudes into an area of state power, it passes the first tier if it is related to
the expenditure program.28 Because Congress may spend for any purpose
(1971).
22. See J. SUNDQUIST, supra note 20, at 1-6; Madden, Future Directions for Federal Assistance
Programs: Lessons from Block Grants and Revenue Sharing, 36 FED. B.J. 107, 107-20 (1977). The
Reagan administration probably will not be able to turn the tide. See note 5 supra.
23. 301 U.S. 548 (1937).
24. Justice Cardozo's decision initially suggested that to be unconstitutional, conditions must be
shown to be "weapons of coercion, destroying or impairing the autonomy of the states." Id. at 586.
Later in the opinion, however, he suggested that a stricter standard might be applied, by reserving the
question whether conditions could be unrelated to matters the national government is empowered to
regulate. Id. at 590. Finally, in distinguishing United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936), which
seemed clear authority that the conditions involved in Steward violated the Constitution, Cardozo
stressed that these conditions had been approved by the state, were revocable by it, and were related to
matters on which the national and state governments could lawfully cooperate. 301 U.S. at 592-93.
25. Vermont v. Brinegar, 379 F. Supp. 606, 616 (D. Vt. 1974). While Brinegar has not been
widely cited, it states concisely and clearly the approach that most courts follow.
26. Id.
27. Congress may expend money for the general welfare of the United States. United States v.
Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 66 (1936); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. Congress has wide power to determine
what is in the general welfare, and is constrained only by limits found elsewhere in the Constitution.
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 90-91 (1976) (per curiam).
28. See, e.g., Oklahoma v. United States Civil Serv. Comm'n, 330 U.S. 127, 142-44 (1947) (up-
holding requirement that state official not participate in partisan politics); Florida v. Mathews, 526
F.2d 319, 325-26 (5th Cir. 1976) (upholding condition regulating occupations of members of state
licensing board); Arizona State Dep't of Pub. Welfare v. HEW, 449 F.2d 456, 473-74, 479 (9th Cir.
1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 919 (1972) (upholding condition requiring state to form advisory com-
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that does not violate the Constitution, no condition would violate this test
provided that it is attached to the appropriate expenditure program. 9 The
first tier of the test thus provides no check on national incursions into
areas of state power.
The second tier requires inducement, rather than coercion, of state ac-
tion. If the courts were actually to put this tier of the test into effect, they
presumably would often have to reach a conclusion about the mental state
of legislators at the time they accepted a condition in order to determine
whether the acceptance was made under "duress." To perform such group
psychological analysis is exceedingly difficult, and there is no reason to
believe that judges have any special expertise at the task."0
The inherent difficulties of the coercion test have led the courts, when-
ever they have reviewed conditions attached to grants, to find state accept-
ance of the conditions to be voluntary." This result is unsurprising given
the implausibility of the idea of reading the legislative mind. Because a
state is, in a formal sense, free to take or reject national money, and be-
cause coercion is practically unverifiable, the courts have resorted to the
fiction of concluding that the state must be acting "voluntarily" when it
accepts money and the conditions attached to it." Thus, the second tier of
mittees for its welfare program); Florida Dep't of Health & Rehabilitative Serv. v. Califano, 449 F.
Supp. 274, 283-85 (N.D. Fla.), afl'd per curiam on opinion of court below, 585 F.2d 150 (5th Cir.
1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 931 (1979) (upholding condition imposing extensive organizational re-
quirements on state agency administering program).
29. The condition need not be directly related to the expenditure. Congress conditions the receipt
of over 40 separate health care programs on a state's adoption of a particular cost control program for
health care. 42 U.S.C.A. § 300m (West Supp. 1981). The conditions were upheld in their original
form in North Carolina ex rel. Morrow v. Califano, 445 F. Supp. 532 (E.D.N.C. 1977), alfd mem.,
435 U.S. 962 (1978). One commentator, however, has called for a stricter test of the relation between
the condition and the objective. See Kaden, Politics, Money, and State Sovereignty: The Judicial Role,
79 COLUM. L. REV. 847, 896-97 (1979).
30. Courts do examine motive in equal protection analysis. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S.
229, 239-42 (1976). Conditional grant cases, however, pose a special difficulty. In these cases the
legislators themselves may not know "whether they have been "coerced," for they may never have
decided independently whether they would want to embrace the policy that the national condition
requires that they adopt. Furthermore, even when it is clear that the legislators oppose a condition, it
is unclear what would constitute coercion. In the equal protection context, either a conscious choice is
involved, or the absence of a conscious choice is dispositive. See id. at 242 ("invidious discriminatory
purpose" required). Yet in spite of this comparatively clear standard, court determinations of school
board motive in segregation cases have proven questionable and inconsistent. See Note, Reading the
Mind of the School Board: Segregative Intent and the De Facto/De Jure Distinction, 86 YALE L.J.
317, 322-26 (1976).
31. Kaden, supra note 29, at 893.
32. There have been numerous cases in which courts have reasoned that state action is voluntary
because the state may accept or reject the national grant. E.g., Oklahoma v. United States Civil Serv.
Comm'n, 330 U.S. 127, 143-44 (1947); Walker Field, Colo., Pub. Airport Auth. v. Adams, 606 F.2d
290, 297-98 (10th Cir. 1979); Florida v. Mathews, 526 F.2d 3119, 325-26 (5th Cir. 1976); Oklahoma
v. Harris, 480 F. Supp. 581, 588 (D.D.C. 1979); Florida Dep't of Health & Rehabilitative Serv. v.
Califano, 449 F. Supp. 274, 284 (N.D. Fla.), afI'd per curiam on opinion of court below, 585 F.2d
150 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 931 (1979); Montgomery County v. Califano, 449 F. Supp.
1230, 1247 (D. Md. 1978), afld, 599 F.2d 1048 (4th Cir. 1979); North Carolina ex rel Morrow v.
Califano, 445 F. Supp. 532, 536 (E.D.N.C. 1977), aff'd mem., 435 U.S. 962 (1978); Goodin v.
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the Steward Machine test has no bite.33
As a result of the failure of coercion analysis, the national government
can effectively force almost any policy on the states by manipulating the
amount of money the states receive. There is clear evidence that states
adopt policies they would not otherwise adopt-policies opposed by a ma-
jority of their citizens-if the payoff in national money is big enough. 4
Although the state's citizens may favor the particular bargain, the state's
acceptance of a condition it would not otherwise accept suggests that the
present system of controlling conditional grants endangers the Federalist
allocation of powers.
II. The Role of the States in the Federal System
The values of Federalism remain central to our system of government.
In order to protect those values it is necessary to define a zone of exclusive
state powers that will be protected from the incursions of the national
government.
A. The Relevance of Federalism
The goals that a Federalist system of allocating power furthers are nu-
merous and interrelated. First, liberty is safest when governmental power
is divided vertically as well as horizontally. The more centers of power
in a nation, the more difficult it is for any individual or faction to control
Oklahoma, 436 F. Supp. 583, 586 (W.D. Okla. 1977).
33. Some commentators have suggested that National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833
(1976), signals new limits on conditional grants, apparently on the theory that if Congress may not
invade the realm of essental state functions directly, it may not do so indirectly either. Stewart, Pyra-
mids of Sacrifice? Problems of Federalism in Mandating State Implementation of National Environ-
mental Policy, 86 YALE L.J. 1196, 1261-62 (1977) (suggesting that conditions must be closely related
to state activity receiving national funds); Comment, Toward New Safeguards on Conditional Spend-
ing: Implications of National League of Cities v. Usery, 26 AM. U.L. REV. 726, 744-46 (1977).
National League of Cities, however, which addressed direct and mandatory regulation of states, poses
no challenge to the traditional analysis of conditional funding, which focuses on whether state accept-
ance of the condition is voluntary. Furthermore, National League of Cities explicitly states that the
decision does not reach the issue of conditional grants. 426 U.S. at 852 n.17. The "coercion analysis
with bite" suggested by these commentators cannot be derived from National League of Cities.
The cases on conditional grants to states since National League of Cities have continued to use the
analysis of Steward Machine Co. See note 32 supra (citing cases); cf. Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S.
448, 473-75 (1980) (plurality opinion) (Burger, C.J.) (approving "the use of [conditional grants] to
induce governments and private parties to cooperate voluntarily with federal policy"). At least one
commentator has concluded that National League of Cities will not limit conditional grants. Com-
ment, Federal Interference with Checks and Balances in State Government: A Constitutional Limit on
the Spending Power, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 402, 417 (1979).
34. For example, Wyoming recently decided not to confront the national government over the
uniform national speed limit, in spite of widespread citizen opposition to the limit, because of a fear
that it would lose national highway funds. Christian Science Monitor, Feb. 14, 1979, at 2, col. 1.
35. Federalism divides power vertically, between the national and state governments. Separation
of powers divides power horizontally, among the executive, legislative, and judicial branches.
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that nation for the purpose of repression?6 Second, the closer a unit of
government is to the people it serves, the more likely it will be to imple-
ment policy goals they desire. 7 Third, smaller organizations-and hence
governmental units-because they are more easily controlled and man-
aged, tend to be less bureaucratic and more efficient." Smaller organiza-
tions are more likely to experiment with new approaches to problems and
thus discover more effective ways of achieving policy goals?9 Fourth, the
vertical division of governmental power provides regionalism and other
factionalisms with a healthy outlet, helping to prevent the rise of separa-
tist movements. Although there are limits to the amount of diversity al-
lowed by the Constitution, 0 the adoption of a Federal system, with its
opportunities for diversity, provides a vehicle for letting off steam, and
thus helps to maintain the legitimacy of the national government."1 Fi-
nally, in helping to preserve cultural and other kinds of diversity, Federal-
ism checks the tendency of centralization to impose a boring sameness
upon the nation.42
The Constitution enumerates the powers of the various branches of the
national government and the rights of the American people. Its failure
similarly to enumerate explicitly the powers of the states should not be
taken as an implicit derogation of those powers. The Tenth Amendment
reminds us that those powers not delegated to the national government
belong to the states,"3 and the document as a whole presumes a significant
36. THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (J. Madison) (E. Earle ed. 1937).
37. See R. DAHL & E. TUFTE, SIZE AND DEMOCRACY 65 (1973); Kaden, supra note 29, at 853-
54.
38. See Elazar, Cursed by Bigness or Toward a Post-Technocratic Federalism, PUBLIUS, Fall
1973, at 239, 280-81; Goodwin, The Shape of American Politics, COMMENTARY, June 1967, at 25,
36-37; Wildavsky, A Bias Toward Federalism: Confronting the Conventional Wisdom on the Deliv-
ery of Governmental Services, PUBLIUS, Spring 1976, at 95, 118-19. Recent research into the consoli-
dation of local services, such as police departments and schools, shows that smaller scale operations
tend to provide better services and cost less than larger scale ones. See Ostrom, Size and Performance
In a Federal System, PUBLIUS, Spring 1976, at 33, 72-73; Rogers & Lipsey, Metropolitan Reforms:
Citizen Evaluations of Performances in Nashville-Davidson County, Tennessee, PUBLIUS, Fall 1974,
at 19, 32-33.
39. See I. SHARKANSKY, THE MALIGNED STATES 14 (2d ed.1978). If there is significant meaning
to Mr. Justice Brandeis' famous model of states as "laboratories" for experimentation, New State Ice
Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 310-11 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting), it must be that small organi-
zations are more likely to experiment than big ones, for the national government would be free to set
up model, localized experiments even without states. The equal protection clause might, however,
prevent it from engaging in some experiments such as using different penalties for the same crime.
40. For example, the Constitution prohibits states from granting titles of nobility. U.S. CONT.
art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
41. See R. DAHL, PLURALIST DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES 173 (1967); M. DANIELSON, A
HERSHEY, & J. BAYNE, ONE NATION, SO MANY GOVERNMENTS 8-9 (1977).
42. See 1 A. DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 91-92 (P. Bradley ed. 1945).
43. "The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to
the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." U.S. CONST. amend. X. In United
States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941), the Court characterized the Tenth Amendment as nothing more
than a truism, creating no independent limit on national power. Id. at 124. By holding that even when
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role for them." The states are given a general police power, which over-
laps with the powers of the national government." But they are also given
a set of exclusive powers, allocated to them either by explicit language of
the Constitution, or by implicit reservation, as determined by the courts."6
B. The States' Exclusive Powers
Although exclusive state powers could once be identified by looking to
those powers not explicitly delegated to the national government by the
Constitution, the lesson of the post-1937 decisions on national power47 is
that this understanding of Federalism is no longer acceptable. There sim-
ply are no meaningful internal limits to national power.48 The post-1937
cases do not imply that the realm of exclusive state powers is an empty
set; they merely shift the focus of analysis. Instead of determining whether
the power is among those delegated to the national government, two in-
quiries become necessary. First, the courts must examine whether the par-
ticular use of the power invades an area delegated exclusively to the states;
that is, whether it violates an external limit on the power of the national
government. Second, the courts must examine whether, in accepting the
national condition, the state has allowed the national government to influ-
ence its exercise of a power delegated exclusively to the states. Federalism
analysis must, therefore, shift from examining the limits of national power
to searching for those areas of state power that may not be invaded or
voluntarily relinquished.
There are three types of exclusive state powers: control over internal
Congress has plenary power over a matter it may not exercise that power in a way that impairs
certain attributes of state "sovereignty," National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 845
(1976), the Court has implicitly rejected the Darby analysis. See 426 U.S. at 842-43.
44. Texas v. White, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 700, 725 (1869) ("[Tihe preservation of the States, and the
maintenance of their governments, are as much within the design and care of the Constitution as the
preservation of the Union and the maintenance of the National government. The Constitution, in all
its provisions, looks to an indestructible Union, composed of indestructible States.")
45. Ziffrin, Inc. v. Reeves, 308 U.S. 132, 139-41 (1939).
46. See pp. 1702-09 infra.
47. See Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942); United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941);
Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548 (1937); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S.
1 (1937).
48. Diamond, The Forgotten Doctrine of Enumerated Powers, PUBLIUS, Fall 1976, at 187, 187;
see Stern, The Commerce Clause Revisited-The Federalization of Intrastate Crime, 15 AIZ. L.
REV. 271, 284-85 (1973). Martin Diamond believed that internal limits should be resurrected in
order to preserve Federalism. Justice Rehnquist recently argued that such limits do exist under pre-
sent law. Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 101 S.Ct. 2352, 2389-92 (1981)
(Rehnquist, J., concurring). There are, however, no recent cases enforcing internal limits on the
power of the national government. The Court seems to have rejected that approach in favor of one
protecting certain realms of exclusive state powers. In National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S.
833 (1976), it held unconstitutional the application of minimum wage laws to the states, not on the
basis of an internal limit on the commerce clause, id. at 841, but on the ground that the exercise of
that power invaded a protected attribute of state "sovereignty." Id. at 845.
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governmental structure, control over certain areas of substantive social
policy, and control over part of the process of changing the Federal sys-
tem. What follows is a tentative attempt to identify and describe those
powers.49
Type I: Control Over Internal Governmental Structure. A state has the
power to establish and structure its government, allocating power as it
wishes."0 It is for a state to decide, for example, whether it wishes to adopt
a principle such as separation of powers. The only limitations on this
power are those contained in the Constitution itself."'
Decisions such as whether to have a bicameral or unicameral legisla-
ture,52 what executive offices should be created and how their occupants
should be chosen, how long state officials' terms of office should be,
whether to have an elective or appointive judiciary, how power should be
allocated within the state government, what political subdivisions should
be created, and what the powers of those subdivisions should be are all
decisions allocating power within a state, and should therefore be consid-
ered Type I exclusive state powers. The power to decide such matters as
where the state capital should be located, 3 how much state and local em-
ployees performing traditional governmental functions should be paid,"4
and what rules should govern that traditional type of state employment"5
49. Professor Stewart suggests two types of state power deserving of constitutional protection,
Stewart, supra note 33, at 1231-32, corresponding closely with what this Note labels Types I and II
power, see pp. 1702-08 infra. His failure to mention Type III power, see pp. 1708-09 infra, is
probably an oversight brought about by its limited relevance to the subject he is discussing-the Fed-
eralism problems relevant to national environmental policy. Stewart does not, however, describe his
two types of powers as exclusive state powers, and, by including within his second category all services
that states provide, he includes powers that the states do not hold exclusively. See Stewart, supra note
33, at 1232.
This Note does not seek to provide a complete listing of exclusive state powers; it seeks only to
demonstrate that such a realm exists. The area of Type II power is intentionally left incomplete,
because the Court has yet to make clear the extent of that power. States may possess other related
types of exclusive powers as well. See, e.g., Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 152-219 (1970)
(Harlan, J., dissenting in part) (states have broad powers to set qualifications for voting in national
elections); id. at 293-96 (Stewart, J., dissenting in part) (same).
50. See Mayor of Philadelphia v. Educational Equality League, 415 U.S. 605, 615 n.13 (1974);
Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 256 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., concurring in result); High-
land Farms Dairy, Inc. v. Agnew, 300 U.S. 608, 612 (1937); Dreyer v. Illinois, 187 U.S. 71, 84
(1902).
51. See Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 124 (1970) (separate opinion) (Black, J.). Mitchell
invalidated an attempt by Congress to determine the qualifying age for voting in state elections, a
clear intrusion into Type I power. The passage of the Twenty-sixth Amendment, which established
the 18-year-old vote, followed. The most notable constitutional limit on the exercise of this power is
the so-called "one man-one vote" rule for apportioning state legislatures, see Reynolds v. Sims, 377
U.S. 533 (1964), and for electing state officers, see Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368 (1963). Congress
has the power to enforce Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendment limits. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5;
id. amend. XV, § 2; see pp. 1710-11 infra.
52. See Stewart, supra note 33, at 1231.
53. See Coyle v. Oklahoma, 221 U.S. 559 (1911).




is also exclusively the states'.
Type I power is of great significance because without control over their
governmental processes,. states would become nothing more than adminis-
trative arms of the national government, ceasing to exist as independent
realms of power."' Such a result would make a nullity of Federalism. An
entity that does not possess Type I power cannot possess any other type of
power exclusively, because its creator can always force it to carry out a
desired policy by threatening to alter or destroy it. Moreover, from a view
of politics that considers questions of governmental process to be as impor-
tant to liberty as questions of substance, 7 Type I power is important for
its own sake, for decisions concerning it raise significant social policy
questions.
Type II: Control Over Certain Areas of Substantive Social Policy.
States also possess exclusive power over a number of areas-of substantive
social policy. If states were to have complete control over their governmen-
tal structure, but have supreme authority over no matters of substantive
social policy, the former power would be meaningless. It is senseless to
speak of the "separate and independent existence" ' of states if that exis-
tence has no substantive purpose. The argument that although states may
not be destroyed, they have no substantive power Congress cannot pre-
empt, leaves them nothing more than vestigial organs.
In Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n 9 the Su-
preme Court interpreted its decision in National League of Cities v.
User/ ° in a manner that could effectively rob the states of exclusive
power over any substantive matters. The Court reasoned that for an oth-
erwise valid exercise of the commerce clause to fall under National
League of Cities, it must regulate the states as states, address matters that
are attributes of sovereignty (what this Note calls exclusive state powers),
and impair. the states' ability to structure integral operations in areas of
traditional functions.6" Given that there are no longer any internal limits
to national powers, the first requirement of this tripartite test would effec-
tively immunize any national invasion of a substantive area from constitu-
tional scrutiny. Should Hodel's analysis be adhered to by the Court, the
states would be vestigial organs, sovereigns in an empty realm.
Although the Tenth Amendment is the Constitution's only explicit gui-
56. Professor Stewart suggests that Type I power is more fundamental than Type II because it is
"more basic and logically prior" to other types of power. Stewart, supra note 33, at 1232.
57. Eg., J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980).
58. National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 851 (1976) (quoting Coyle v. Oklahoma,
221 U.S. 559, 580 (1911)).
59. 101 S.Ct. 2352 (1981).
60. 426 U.S. 833 (1979).
61. 101 S.Ct. at 2366.
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dance on the question of which substantive areas of social policy are left to
the states, the content of these powers has been at least partially filled in
by judicial decision, and it is clear that some such powers exist. In Erie
Railroad v. Tomkins,62 the Court, in invalidating the then-longstanding,
judicially created national common law, held that Congress has no power
to make law in the substantive areas covered by that common law63 be-
cause the Constitution allocates that power to the states." While Erie
teaches that the Constitution places some areas of substantive social policy
62. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
63. Id. at 78. The court gave as examples commercial law and the law of torts. Id.
64. Id. at 80. The Erie decision was widely accepted, but some commentators have suggested that
it should have rested on statutory, not constitutional grounds. See Clark, State Law in the Federal
Courts: The Brooding Omnipresence of Erie v. Tompkins, 55 YALE L.J. 267, 278 (1946); Cook, The
Federal Courts and the Conflict of Laws, 36 ILL. L. REV. 493, 515-24 (1942); Ely, The Irrepressible
Myth of Erie, 87 HARV. L. REV. 693, 706 (1974). The Court, however, recognized the constitutional
basis of the Erie doctrine in Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of America, 350 U.S. 198, 202 (1956).
Other commentators have agreed that the Erie doctrine is constitutional. See Friendly, In Praise of
Erie-And of the New Federal Common Law, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 383, 385-98 (1964); Mishkin,
Some Further Last Words on Erie-The Thread, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1682 (1974).
Professor Ely also argues against the proposition that Erie creates a sphere of state power that the
national government may not enter. Ely, supra, at 705-06. Professor Mishkin agrees with him on this
issue, while arguing that Erie is a constitutional decision in that it prohibits both Congress and the
courts from exceeding the powers delegated to them by the Constitution. Mishkin, supra, at 1682-83.
In the Ely-Mishkin view, there are apparently no exclusive state powers other than those powers not
granted to Congress by Article I of the Constitution. The view is, of course, consistent with the Darby
theory of the Tenth Amendment. United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 124 (1941); see note 43
supra.
This principle has been taken to be the meaning of the majority opinion in Hanna v. Plumer, 380
U.S. 460 (1965) (national courts will not be bound in diversity cases by state procedural rules when
those rules conflict with valid national procedural rules). Justice Harlan's concurring opinion in
Hanna argued that the majority was wrong to the extent that its reasoning would allow a national
procedural rule to prevent the enforcement of a substantive state rule in diversity cases. Id. at 474-78
(Harlan, J., concurring). Harlan's view has received scholarly support. See McCoid, Hanna v.
Plumer. The Erie Doctrine Changes Shape, 51 VA. L. REV. 884, 907-08 (1965); Stason, Choice of
Law Within The Federal System: Erie versus Hanna, 52 CORNELL L.Q. 377, 400-01 (1967). Be-
cause, absent any intrusion upon state substantive law, the federal procedural rule would be a valid
exercise of national power, the Harlan view reduces to the proposition that there is a sphere of state
law into which the national government may not enter even when it is given certain types of plenary
power that would seem to enable it to do so. See Ely, supra, at 700-02. To the extent that Hanna
suggested the contrary, it may be called into question by National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S.
833- (1976), which held that "there are attributes of sovereignty attaching to every state government
which may not be impaired by Congress, not because Congress may lack an affirmative grant of
legislative authority to reach the matter, but because the Constitution prohibits it from exercising the
authority in that manner." Id. at 845. Of course, National League of Cities reached only the question
of the national government's use of the commerce clause. Id. at 852 n.17.
In Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740, 747-48 (1980), the Court applied the Hanna
approach of examining whether the national procedural rule is "within a constitutional grant of
power," id. at 748, without considering whether a state power had been invaded. Since the Court
applied the state procedural rule under this analysis, the issue of a conflict between it and the national
rule was not reached. Id. at 752 n.14.
Reading National League of Cities and Erie together leads to the conclusion that there are areas of
substantive social policy over which states have exclusive power. Those like Professor Ely who criti-
cize the "state enclave" theory of Erie (which is nothing more than a different name for the theory of
exclusive state powers) do so because they fail to recognize the shift in Federalism analysis that this
Note has examined. See pp. 1701-02 supra.
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exclusively within the province of the states, it does not identify those ar-
eas." They have, however, been spelled out in other contexts.
One such area is the power to establish laws of descent and succession.
In United States v. Burnison," the Court held that the Constitution allo-
cates to the states the power to make law regulating the succession of
property.'7 This power is so fundamental that national courts will gener-
ally not consider probate matters, even when there is diversity of
citizenship."
A second area is the power to regulate family life." This area includes
the power to set rules regulating such matters as marriage and divorce,7"
adoption and foster parent relations,7 and the removal of children from
their parents for neglect and abuse.7 2
65. The Court said only that "Congress has no power to declare substantive rules of common law
applicable in a State whether they be local in their nature or 'general,' be they commercial law or a
part of the law of torts." 304 U.S. at 78. Erie was decided before the full extent of the national
government's power under the commerce clause was recognized.
66. 339 U.S. 87 (1950).
67. Id. at 91-92. Burnison was cited approvingly in United States v. Little Lake Misere Land
Co., 412 U.S. 580, 592 n.10 (1973). The Court took the same position without citing Burnison in
dicta in Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. 532, 583 (1971) (overruled on other grounds by Trimble v.
Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977)). The specific holding of Labine, that a state's estate law may discrimi-
nate against illegitimate children, has been overturned by Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977).
Trimble, however, does not call into question Labine's recognition that the Constitution assigns the
power to make law on this subject to the states, see 430 U.S. at 776 n.17, as the Court seems to have
recognized when it limited Trimble in Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259, 268 (1978) (plurality opinion)
(Powell, J.).
Labine, written by Justice Black, implicitly limited the scope of an earlier decision written by
Black, United States v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 643 (1961) (constitutional for national statute to require
that personal property left by wards of national government who die in national facilities be turned
over to national government). Justices Douglas and Whittaker dissented in that case, arguing that the
national law intruded upon state powers guaranteed by the Tenth Amendment. Id. at 654-55. Oregon
can only be reconciled with Burnison and Labine by seeing the former as a case in which the national
government was, in effect, charging the individual for the service he was receiving in accordance with
his ability to pay, rather than as a case involving the law of estates.
In Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429 (1968), the Court invalidated an Oregon succession statute
addressing foreign heirs. The decision, while based on the fact that matters of foreign affairs are left
to Congress, in no way suggests that exclusive state powers can be invaded by Congress. The decision
can be reconciled with the claim that the law of succession is an exclusive state power because the
Court interpreted the Oregon law as an attempt not to regulate succession, but to make foreign policy.
Id. at 437-38; see id. at 441 (state not permitted to "establish its own foreign policy").
68. P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO, & H. WECHSLER, HART & WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL
COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 1183-89 (2d ed. 1973); Hart, The Relations Between State and
Federal Law, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 489, 509 (1954).
69. McCarty v. McCarty, 101 S.Ct. 2728, 2735 (1981); Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 404 (1975)
("[The] area [of domestic relations] has long been regarded as a virtually exclusive province of the
States."); In re Burrus, 136 U.S. 586, 593-94 (1890).
70. Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 404 (1975).
71. Cf Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 391 (1979) (state has strong interest in providing
procedure for adoption of illegitimate children); Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality
& Reform, 431 U.S 816, 856 (1977) (Stewart J., concurring in judgment) (foster parent-foster child
relationship is "wholly a creation of the State").
72. See Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 649 (1972).
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A third area left to the states is the power to create land use laws" and
general property law. 4 State power is so wide in the latter area that, in
the context of the Fourteenth Amendment's property clause, under which
one might expect "property" to be defined by the Constitution, the Su-
preme Court has made clear that the meaning of "property" is generally a
matter of state law.75
73. See Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 4 (1974); Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty
Co., 272 U.S. 365, 387 (1926).
One limit on the extent of this power is national regulation pursuant to the property clause, U.S.
CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2, under which the national government may regulate nationally held lands or
activities that affect them, Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529, 536-41 (1976) (upholding under
property clause national regulation of wild animals that roam on both public and private lands).
While Kleppe contains language characterizing the national government's power under the clause as
"without limitations," id. at 539, a careful reading of the case suggests that the Court is referring to
internal limits. Kleppe does not necessarily mean that the national government has the power to
regulate land use unrelated to nationally held preserves. See Sax, Helpless Giants: The National
Parks and the Regulation of Private Lands, 75 MICH. L. REV. 239, 250-55 (1976); Note, The Prop-
erty Power, Federalism, and the Equal Footing Doctrine, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 817, 825 (1980).
The Court assumed without deciding that the power to regulate land use is what this Note would
call an exclusive state power in Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass' n, 101 S. Ct.
2352, 2369 n.34 (1981). Due to the interpretation it gave National League of Cities v. Usery, how-
ever, see p. 1703 supra, it upheld a national intrusion on that power.
74. See Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 349 n.14 (1976) (there is no "federal common law of
property rights").
It is unclear what "general property law" means and what the extent of this state power is. The
law of commercial instruments, for example, while sometimes referred to as a matter of "property
law," is not within this power, because it is closely connected to commerce. The general rule is that
"property ownership is not governed by a general federal law, but rather by the laws of the several
States." Oregon ex rel. State Land Bd. v. Corvalis Sand & Gravel Co., 429 U.S. 363, 378 (1977); see
Davies Warehouse Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 144, 155 (1944). When a national interest is directly
implicated, however, national law is often applied under the doctrine of Clearfield Trust Co. v.
United States, 318 U.S. 363 (1943). There are numerous property law cases in which national law
has been applied under Clearfield Trust reasoning. See, e.g., McCarty v. McCarty, 101 S.Ct. 2728
(1981) (national law on military retirement pay preempts state community property law); United
States v. Chandler, 410 U.S. 257, 262 (1973) (national rather than state law governs validity of
donations of United States Savings Bonds); Free v. Bland, 369 U.S. 663, 668 (1962) (national law
creating right of survivorship in United States Savings Bonds preempts state community property
law); United States v. Shimer, 367 U.S. 374, 381 (1961) (national rather than state law applies to
terms of national veterans' mortgage loan guarantees). These cases do not disprove the claim that
there is an exclusive state power to make property law; they merely limit the extent of that power to
situations not directly affecting a legitimate national interest. See Sunderland v. United States, 266
U.S" 226, 232-33 (1924).
The importance of the states' power here causes the Court often to assume, absent evidence to the
contrary, that Congress intends to apply state law, even though it may have the power to apply
national law. See, e.g., United States v. Yalzell, 382 U.S. 341, 352 (1966) (state law of coverture
prevented Small Business Administration recovery of deficiency on SBA loan). While such an analysis
is clearly appropriate for cases in which the national government has a legitimate interest and in
which there is a question whether state law has been adopted by Congress or should be adopted by
the courts, the Court often analyzes cases in which the state law must apply of its own force as if they
involve the question of congressional adoption of state law. Such an approach may have the advantage
of avoiding the unnecessary confrontation of constitutional issues, but is inappropriate when Congress
does not have the power to preempt state law. See United States v. Little Lake Misere Land Co., 412
U.S. 580, 605 (1973) (Stewart, J., concurring in judgment); id. at 606-07 (Rehnquist, J., concurring
in judgment). The analysis of this Note suggests that it would be more appropriate to approach such
cases by examining whether the matter is one left to the states by the Constitution.
75. Leis v. Flynt, 439 U.S. 438, 441 (1979); Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972).
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A fourth substantive area left to the states is the power to provide cer-
tain services, such as police and fire protection, to their citizens. In Na-
tional League of Cities v. Usery," the Court invalidated an amendment"
that applied the Fair Labor Standards Act" to state and municipal em-
ployees, at least in part because that legislation adversely affected the abil-
ity of states to provide those services." If the provision of such traditional
services were not an exclusive state power, the adverse effects on the
states' ability to provide them would not have been a reason to overturn
the amendment.8 0 Because the national government may not impair the
exercise of an "attribute of sovereignty" even if it has constitutional au-
thority that would otherwise enable it to reach a matter,"' those attributes
of sovereignty must be exclusively state powers. 2
It necessarily follows that a state's decision not to provide these services
is as protected as its decision to provide them under a certain procedure.
Were the national government to provide the services under the general
welfare clause, 3 it would be interfering with state decisions on how much
of and what kinds of such services to provide; moreover, the interference
would be more serious than that caused by the application of minimum
wage laws to state employees. 4
This doctrine does not rob the due process clause of meaning by allowing a state to declare that an
entitlement is not property for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment. Whether the state-created
property right is to be protected by the due process clause is a matter of national constitutional law.
Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 9 (1978). The doctrine simply means that
the Constitution does not determine whether the interest exists.
76. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
77. The Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-259, § 6, 88 Stat. 55 (1974).
78. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
79. The Court noted that application of minimum wage laws to states and municipalities in-
creased the cost of providing services, forcing cutbacks in the provision of these services. It gave as an
example that California had been forced to reduce training of highway patrolmen. 426 U.S. at 846--
47.
80. For this very reason National League of Cities did not overrule United States v. California,
297 U.S. 175 (1936). Because the latter case concerned only the regulation of a state-run railroad, and
therefore did not involve an exclusive state power, see National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S.
833, 854 n.18, 855 (1976), the intrusion of national regulation on state activity did not violate the
Constitution.
81. 426 U.S. at 845.
82. Professor Tribe recognized this interpretation of National League of Cities, but rejected it for
the curious reason that the Court has not protected the states' role as "lawmaker[s] and regulator[s] of
private conduct." Tribe, Unraveling National League of Cities: The New Federalism and Affirmative
Rights to Essential Government Services, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1065, 1074-75 (1977). As this Note seeks
to demonstrate, however, there are areas in which the states are indeed the exclusive regulators of
private conduct.
83. "The Congress shall have Power. . . to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence
and general Welfare of the United States . . . " U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
84. Thus the Court notes that one example of the exercise of a state's power to provide these
services is the reliance on "volunteers." National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 850-51
(1976). The decision to rely on volunteers is essentially a decision to rely on private individuals to
provide that service and not to provide it directly through a governmental unit. Thus a state's exclu-
sive power must logically extend to that decision. Direct national provision of these services would
impair that exercise of an exclusive state power, and would therefore be unconstitutional. See Stewart,
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The Court left unclear exactly which services fall within the realm of
exclusive state power. Although the examples of "fire prevention, police
protection, sanitation, public health, and parks and recreation" were
given,"5 the Court explicitly indicated that the list was not all-inclusive.86
The Court also suggested including primary and secondary education and
hospitals in the list." The responsibility for resolving which services fall
within this exclusive state power rests, ultimately, with the courts. Na-
tional League of Cities does indicate, however, that the determining factor
is whether the service is an integral governmental function traditionally
provided by the states. 8
A fifth substantive power left to the states involves an intersection be-
tween Type I and Type II power. This power is the authority to use the
coercive power of a state against its citizens.8 State powers to tax and to
impose legal sanctions on individuals fall within this category. While the
national government possesses a corresponding power, the state's power to
exercise its own coercive authority is exclusively its own."
Type III: Power to Take Part in Changing the Federal System. The
Constitution gives the states a critical role in changing the federal system
by making their participation a mandatory part of the amending process.
State legislatures may, by petitioning Congress, begin the process of call-
ing a constitutional convention. Furthermore, the states have the final say
on the approval of any amendment, either through their legislatures or
through conventions of their citizens.9 The provisions of the Constitution
supra note 33, at 1232.
85. 426 U.S. at 851.
86. Id. at 851 n.16.
87. Id. at 855. Education has been recognized in other decisions as a matter of state power. As the
Supreme Court noted in Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954), "education is perhaps
the most important function of state and local governments." More recently, the Court explicitly
recognized the limitations on its own power to intervene in this field, pointing out that, "[b]y and
large, public education in our Nation is committed to the control of state and local authorities." Ep-
person v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968).
88. The Court seems to use the words "integral" and "traditional" interchangeably. Compare 426
U.S. at 851, 855 ("integral governmental functions") with id. at 852 ("traditional governmental func-
tions"). The test cannot be strictly historical because some services falling within the area have not
been provided by the states throughout the country's history. For example, free public education did
not become prevalent in the United States until about 1860. L. CREMIN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF
THE SCHOOL 13 (1961). The courts will undoubtedly consider both whether there is a tradition of
state provision of the service and the importance of state provision of the service to the achievement of
the goals of Federalism. Of course analysis of this sort is also required in applying National League of
Cities to direct regulation of state governments.
89. See District of Columbia v. Train, 521 F.2d 971, 994 (D.C. Cir. 1975), vacated and re-
manded per curiam sub nom. EPA v. Brown, 431 U.S. 99 (1977) (national government may not force
states to "administer and enforce federal regulatory programs").
90. The one exception to this power limits its extent without calling into question its existence.
States must open their courts to the enforcement of rights created by national law if they open them to
the enforcement of similar rights created by state law. Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386, 394 (1947).
91. U.S. CONS-T. art. V.
92. Id. Historically there are two exceptions to this argument. First, the Fifteenth Amendment
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that require a state to agree before its representation in the Senate is re-
duced9" or before another state is formed out of territory within its bor-
ders94 further strengthen the states' role in the process of changing the
federal system.
C. The Limits on Exclusive State Powers
To say that states possess exclusive powers is not to say that there are
no limits on those powers. Virtually all of the provisions of the Bill of
Rights have been applied to the states by incorporation in the Fourteenth
Amendment.9 In addition, the Constitution establishes other limits to
state power, both explicitly96 and by judicial interpretation.97 While state
exercise of exclusive power is limited by judicial enforcement of individual
rights, this limit presents no more threat to the exclusivity of these powers
vis-a-vis the national government than such enforcement against the
was ratified by the states of Virginia, Mississippi, and Texas as a requirement of their readmission to
the Union. Act of Apr. 10, 1869, ch. 17, § 6, 16 Stat. 40; J. MATHEWS, LEGISLATIVE AND JUDICIAL
HISTORY OF THE FIFTEENTH AMENDMENT 75 (1909). Second, three of the states that, in theory,
ratified the Fourteenth Amendment had previously rejected that amendment, and, along with other
Southern States, subsequently had their governments replaced by Congress. See Coleman v. Miller,
307 U.S. 433, 448 (1939). Coercion was clearly an element in these ratifications. Powell, Changing
Constitutional Phases, 19 B.U. L. REV. 509, 511 (1939). Both amendments have been accepted by the
courts on the theory that the validity of an amendment is a political question. Coleman v. Miller, 307
U.S. at 449-50 (Fourteenth Amendment); White v. Hart, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 646, 649 (1872) (dic-
tum) (Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments). It is doubtful that these incidents from the period
immediately following the Civil War can serve as precedent for the proposition that, as a part of the
normal amending process, Congress may force a state to pass an amendment. L. ORFIELD, THE
AMENDING OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 73-74 (1942).
A more serious question is whether the Court will address a case involving such an issue under the
political question doctrine. Coleman holds only that the question of how to treat a legislature's previ-
ous rejection of, or recision of acceptance of, an amendment is a political question. 307 U.S. at 450.
Even if the entire matter is a political question, that fact does not release Congress from its duty to
obey the Constitution, which clearly leaves the power of ratification to the states. Moreover, it is
doubtful whether the political question doctrine would prevent a court from invalidating a law as
clearly unconstitutional as one that interferes with a state's power to ratify a constitutional amend-
ment. See Note, The Process of Constitutional Amendment, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 106, 145-46 (1979)(Coleman's failure to disapprove of prior cases decided on merits and its quoting of one such case
indicates that some amendment issues are justiciable even under Coleman).
93. U.S. CONST. art. V.
94. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 1.
95. E.g., Duncan v. Louisana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968) (right to trial by jury in criminal cases);
Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965) (right to confront opposing witnesses at criminal trial); Malloy
v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964) (freedom from compelled self-incrimination); Gideon v. Wainwright,
372 U.S. 335 (1963) (right to counsel in felony cases); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (exclusion
of evidence produced by illegal search or seizure). In applying the equal protection clause, however,
the court has indicated that it will apply a more lenient test to the exercise of powers that this Note
characterizes as exclusive state powers. Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291, 295-96 (1978) (exclusion of
aliens from state police force upheld).
96. E.g., U.S. CONST. amend. XXIV (prohibiting poll tax in national elections); U.S. CONST.
amend. XXVI (establishing uniform 18-year-old voting age).
97. E.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (women's right to abortion); Griswold v. Connecticut,
381 U.S. 479 (1965) (right to use contraceptives); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925)
(right of parents to send children to private school).
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national government presents to the exclusivity of certain national powers
vis-a-vis the states. Congressional regulation pursuant to the Fourteenth
and Fifteenth Amendments and the guarantee clause, however, poses more
difficult issues for the theory of exclusive state powers.
1. The Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments
Although legislation pursuant to section five of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment98 and section two of the Fifteenth Amendment,9 unlike legislation
under the commerce clause, may invade what would otherwise be areas of
exclusive state power, these national powers should not be understood to
undermine the concept of such powers. The Fourteenth and Fifteenth
Amendments were adopted to prevent the states from exercising their
powers in ways that violate certain rights of individuals, particularly of
blacks.' 0 Legislation pursuant to these post-Civil War amendments, un-
like legislation pursuant to more general grants of power, may regulate
the states' use of their exclusive powers because that is precisely the pur-
pose of the post-Civil War amendments. ' In exercising this power, how-
ever, Congress is confined to the scope of the amendments. For example,
while it may, when enforcing these amendments, order states to eliminate
as qualifications for the right to vote literacy tests and other conditions
that it finds prevent the exercise of constitutional rights,' 2 it may not use
the amendments as instruments to force on the states voting rules not
grounded in these amendments.t0 3 The post-Civil War amendments do
98. "The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this
article." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
99. "The Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation." U.S.
CONSr. amend. XV, § 2.
100. The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 71-72 (1873).
101. City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 178-80 (1980); Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S.
445, 453-56 (1976).
102. Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 648-56 (1966); South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383
U.S. 301, 333-34 (1966).
103. Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 129-30 (1970) (national requirement of 18-year-old vote
in dtate elections overturned).
Justice Black's opinion in Mitchell helps resolve a possible ambiguity in Katzenbach v. Morgan,
384 U.S. 641 (1966), and South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966), on the scope of con-
gressional power under section five of the Fourteenth Amendment and section two of the Fifteenth
Amendment, respectively. In those two cases the congressional ban of literary tests had to be recon-
ciled with the Court's decision in Lassiter v. Northampton County Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45
(1959), which had held that literacy tests do not necessarily violate the Fourteenth or Fifteenth
Amendments. In Morgan the state argued that Congress could not abolish a state's literacy test with-
out a judicial finding that it violated the equal protection clause. The Court rejected this argument,
ruling that Congress has the power to determine that literacy tests, as applied, violate the equal
protection clause. 384 U.S. at 648-56. In South Carolina the state argued that literacy tests were
constitutional under Lassiter, but the Court ruled that Congress could make a finding that the tests
perpetuated discrimination and suspend them. 383 U.S. at 333-34.
Justice Black's was the swing vote in Mitchell, and four Justices either implicitly agreed with his
explanation of Morgan and South Carolina, 400 U.S. at 293-96 (Stewart, J., concurring in part and
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not, therefore, provide a vehicle for wide-ranging invasions of exclusive
state powers.
2. The Guarantee Clause
The guarantee clause of the Constitution 10 4 has been suggested by at
least one commentator as a possible basis for federal regulation of state
governmental structure.105 The clause on its face authorizes only that Con-
gress "guarantee . . . a Republican Form of Government," not that
Congress dictate the particulars of that form of government. In the many
cases in which Congress has sought to interfere with state governmental
structure, the guarantee clause has not been used as a basis for validating
such intrusions.10 6 There being little basis in the text or the case law for
the proposition that Congress may use the clause to invade exclusive state
powers, it should be interpreted as serving only as a grant to the national
government of the power to prevent states from adopting monarchial, dic-
tatorial, or other non-republican forms of government. 107
dissenting in part) (joined by Burger, C.J., and Blackmun, J.), or took an even stronger view, 400
U.S. at 205-09 (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Black's opinion makes
clear that these conclusions do not mean that Congress can create constitutional requirements out of
whole cloth, but only that Congress has broad power to enforce the provisions of the two amendments.
400 U.S. at 127-29. Congress, then, has the independent power to make determinations of fact, such
as in Morgan and South Carolina, that literacy tests were discriminatory, and, on the basis of these
factual determinations, to enact legislation to enforce the amendments. It may not, however, create
new constitutional law, and thus Mitchell overturned the uniform 18-year-old voting age for state
elections. For a criticism of Mitchell arguing for broader congressional power to interpret the Four-
teenth Amendment, see Cohen, Congressional Power to Interpret Due Process and Equal Protection,
27 STAN. L. REV. 603 (1975).
The discussions of Mitchell, Morgan, and South Carolina in City of Rome v. United States, 446
U.S. 156, 173-78 (1980), and in Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 476-77 (1980) (plurality opin-
ion) (Burger, C.J.), while not completely clear on the issue, appear to follow Mitchells interpretation
of the earlier cases. Justice Powell's opinion in Fullilove clearly limits the explanation of congres-
sional power under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments in Morgan and South Carolina to
enforcing, not creating, constitutional rights. Id. at 500-02 (Powell, J., concurring).
104. "The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican Form of
Government . . . ." U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4.
105. W. WIECEK, THE GUARANTEE CLAUSE OF THE U.S. CONSTITUTION 300 (1972).
106. See, e.g., Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970) (invalidating requirement based on sec-
tion five of the Fourteenth Amendment that states allow 18-year-olds to vote in state elections); Coyle
v. Oklahoma, 221 U.S. 559 (1911) (invalidating requirement based on guarantee clause that state not
move its capital for three years). It should also be noted that neither Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S.
641 (1966), nor South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966), relied upon the guarantee
clause. Indeed, this broad view of the guarantee clause is inconsistent with the perceived need to adopt
the Fourteenth, Fifteenth, Nineteenth, and Twenty-sixth Amendments.
107. That the framers felt a need to spell out this limited power may itself be indicative of the
breadth of Type I exclusive state powers.
Because the guarantee clause has long been regarded as nonjusticiable, Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S.
186, 218-26 (1962); Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1, 42-44 (1849), Congress, by using it,
might attempt to avoid judicial invalidation of an act invading exclusive state powers. In Baker v.
Carr the Court went so far as to say that challenges to congressional action on grounds of "inconsis-
tency with" the clause are nonjusticiable. 369 U.S. at 224. The only cases in which Congress has
sought to regulate the states directly provide little basis for this claim. In Coyle v. Oklahoma, 221
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III. A Proposed Structure For Federalism
The shift of Federalism analysis from an attempt to delineate the inter-
nal limits on national power to an attempt to give content to a zone of
exclusive state powers, and the failure of coercion analysis to prevent
states from allowing the national government to impinge on that zone
through the use of conditional grants, suggest the need for a new doctrine
to address transactions between the states and the national government.
Since attempts to limit the national government's use of conditions have
failed, the preservation of Federalism requires a doctrine that places limits
on the states' power to agree to these conditions.
A. The Requirement of Uninfluenced Decisionmaking
Only a requirement that states make all decisions on matters falling
within exclusive state powers free from the influence of national grants
provides a workable standard for preserving the values of Federalism. Be-
cause the allocation of exclusive powers to the states indicates a constitu-
tional intention that those powers not be exercised by the national govern-
ment, a state's willingness to allow the national government to influence
its decision on such matters by providing it with funds raises serious con-
stitutional questions. "'
The allocation of a matter exclusively to the states signifies a constitu-
tional policy that the national government is not allowed to make the law
in that area. That allocation reflects the goals that our Federalist system
seeks to achieve: diffusion of power throughout the country, increased ac-
countability of governmental institutions to the citizenry, promotion of ef-
ficiency and innovation, relief from the pressures of factionalism and re-
gionalism, and diversity of both culture and politics." 9 When a state
voluntarily allows its decisions on matters within its exclusive powers to
be influenced by a grant from the national government, it frustrates those
U.S. 559 (1911), the Court held that the congressional requirement that Oklahoma not move its
capital was not a valid exercise of the guarantee clause. Id. at 567-68. In Georgia v. Stanton, 73 U.S.
(6 Wall.) 50 (1868), the Court declared the destruction of state governments during Reconstruction a
political question. Id. at 77. The Court made no mention of the guarantee clause in spite of Georgia's
attempt to rely on it. It is doubtful that a case arising out of the Civil War has any bearing on
whether the Court may review a congressional attempt to use the clause to invade state powers.
Furthermore, even assuming a challenge were nonjusticiable, nonjusticiability does not imply constitu-
tionality. Congress has a duty to obey the Constitution independent of whether the Supreme Court
may review its actions. Should the Court be unable to prevent congressional abuse of the guarantee
clause, its inability to do so does not free Congress from its duty to obey the limits of the clause.
108. In the area of general police power-the area in which the national government may simply
preempt state law-these questions do not arise. In this area, the states share their power with the
national government, and hence uninfluenced decisionmaking is not constitutionally required. The
present analysis applies only when exclusive state powers are at issue.
109. See pp. 1699-1700 supra.
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Federalist goals. While the Constitution does not explicitly require the
states to exercise their exclusive powers so independently, it should be
recognized that the Framers could not have foreseen the present financial
dependence of the states on the national government.110 A requirement
that states make decisions on matters within the realm of exclusive state
power uninfluenced by national grants is necessary, therefore, to carry out
the constitutional system of allocating power and to achieve the goals of
Federalism."
When tested against a standard of uninfluenced decisionmaking, state
acceptance of grants whose conditions invade exclusive state powers
fails." 2 In practice, state legislatures often go beyond allowing national
grants to influence their decisions on such policy matters. The states, in
effect, cede the responsibility for making some decisions to the national
government by accepting conditions that are subject to subsequent deter-
mination and revision by national agencies."' This behavior constitutes an
outright abdication of constitutional responsibility; it allows the national
government not merely to influence policy, but to make it. Such an abdi-
cation is a dangerous threat to Federalism and should be found unconsti-
tutional. Furthermore, many programs send funds directly to state agen-
cies, with the state legislature never even participating in the process of
assessing the program's or the condition's wisdom." 4 It is not necessary,
110. See p. 1696 supra.
111. Of course this analysis does not call into question normal political influence over the develop-
ment of policy on matters within the realm of exclusive state powers. Thus a President may threaten
to oppose a Governor's reelection unless the Governor supports a particular policy within this realm.
112. There has been one judicial suggestion of the application to the states of a requirement like
the one this Note proposes. In Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936), the Court indicated
that state powers cannot be "abdicated." Id. at 295. The case did not involve conditional grants. The
abdication language of Carter Coal was repeated by that opinion's author, Justice Sutherland, in his
dissent in Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 615 (1937) (Sutherland, J., dissenting). The
idea was not elaborated on and seems to have been forgotten.
This Note's argument is not undercut by language in cases that have held that a state's acceptance
of conditions is not an abdication of its sovereignty. See, e.g., Carmichael v. Southern Coal & Coke
Co., 301 U.S. 495, 526 (1937) (absent coercion, state and national governments may engage in coop-
erative effort without unconstitutional surrender of sovereignty); Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301
U.S. 548, 597-98 (1937) (states may accept conditions "if the essence of their statehood is maintained
without impairment"). These cases do not distinguish between exclusive state powers and other state
powers. Their failure to do so limits their force now that such a distinction is necessary.
113. For examples of programs whose conditions are subject to revision by national agencies, see
p. 1715-16 infra (grants for community land use planning and for coastal land use planning).
114. See Brown, Federal Funds and National Supremacy: The Role of State Legislatures in Fed-
eral Grant Programs, 28 AM. U.L. REV. 279, 282-83 (1979). There has been a recent movement in
state legislatures to channel national funds through the legislative appropriation process. Id. at 283-
84. The Supreme Court recently declined to hear a case upholding the right of the Pennsylvania
legislature to do so. Thornburgh v. Casey, 440 U.S. 942 (1979), dismissing appeal from Shapp v.
Sloan, 480 Pa. 449, 391 A.2d 595 (1978). In other cases state supreme courts have ruled against these
legislative efforts. E.g., MacManus v. Love, 179 Colo. 218, 499 P.2d 609 (1972); Opinion of the
Justices to the Senate, 375 Mass. 851, 378 N.E.2d 433 (1978). While this reform is a step in the right
direction, it does not prevent legislatures from themselves accepting conditions subject to determination
and revision by the national government.
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however, to examine whether the acceptance of a particular condition is a
rational, calculated decision or an abdication of responsibility. In either
case the state has failed to make an independent determination of the wis-
dom of the condition's underlying policies.
B. General Application of the Requirement of Uninfluenced
Decisionmaking
A state's acceptance of a grant conditioned on a requirement that the
state exercise one of its exclusive powers in a particular manner violates
the requirement of uninfluenced decisionmaking. Of course, the states
may still accept national grants. They may agree to comply with the most
detailed set of conditions imaginable, as long as that grant and those con-
ditions concern a program or function that does not fall within the realm
of exclusive state power. The states may also accept conditions that re-
quire them to comply with national laws enforcing the post-Civil War
Amendments, for those amendments were meant to allow Congress to reg-
ulate the states' exercise of their exclusive powers.11
Within the realm of exclusive state powers, a state may accept block
grants-that is, grants with a condition that the funds go to a particular
broad purpose, such as education-for such grants would not influence
policy formulation on the matter.1 6 The acceptance of conditions requir-
ing the adoption of a particular governmental structure, or the adoption of
a particular policy within the realm of states' Type II exclusive power,
would be unconstitutional. By contrast, a state's agreement to spend funds
on managing its bureaucracy or on a broad matter within its Type II
exclusive powers would be constitutional, for the state would make all
specific policy decisions on how to spend the money.
The requirement of uninfluenced decisionmaking, unlike coercion anal-
ysis, is a limitation on state, not national, power. The state's acceptance of
national conditions, not the conditions themselves, violates this doctrine.
Challenges to the acceptance of conditions that invade exclusive state pow-
115. See pp. 1710 & note 101 supra.
116. The popular technique of requiring states to match national funds would not meet the re-
quirements of this doctrine. The acceptance of such funds would result in the state allowing the
national government to influence the allocation of the state's budget between various possible pro-
grams that involve the exercise of exclusive state powers.
A state's acceptance of in-kind aid from the national government would also fail to meet this test if
that aid is for matters falling within the realm of exclusive state powers. Such aid can be characterized
as a monetary grant with the restrictive condition that it be spent for the purpose of purchasing a
particular good. While acceptance of such a gift from an individual is not called into question by this
analysis, when the gift comes from the national government it poses allocation of power problems. If
the national government were to offer, for example, to "give" the states an entire school system, this
"in-kind" aid would mask a dramatic shift of power from the states to the national government.
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ers must, therefore, come from parties other than the state, "7 for the state
is the party accused of acting unconstitutionally. The national government
could obviously join as a party defendant in any such action, for it would
have a stake in the outcome. The remedy in such a suit would be an
injunction ordering the state not to accept the condition.
IV. Application to Particular National Grants
There are numerous cases of conditions that impinge on exclusive state
powers. State acceptance of these conditions violates the requirement of
uninfluenced decisionmaking.
The Hatch Act"' impinges on the states' Type I power over the quali-
fications of state officials and employees" 9 by requiring that state govern-
ment officials whose principal responsibility concerns an activity funded in
part by national funds or loans not use their official influence or authority
to affect an election or nomination, to run for office, or to solicit funds for
a political organization.1 0 The conditioning of grants on acceptance of the
Hatch Act has been upheld by the Supreme Court. " 1
Two national programs invade the states' Type II exclusive power over
land use planning"' by funding the development of comprehensive com-
munity land use plans and the development and implementation of coastal
zone use plans only when such plans meet national policy objectives.2 3
The Department of Housing and Urban Development recently tightened
the regulations governing grants for community land use plans to ensure
that state plans meet national land use goals.'24 A state cannot receive
national funds for the implementation of a coastal zone management plan
until that plan meets national requirements and has been approved by the
117. Such parties would have to have the requisite personal stake in the action, in the form of a
"'distinct and palpable injury,'" Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, Inc., 438
U.S. 59, 72 (1978) (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501 (1975)), and a "'fairly traceable'
causal connection between the claimed injury and the challenged conduct," id. (quoting Arlington
Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 261 (1977)). For an injured party, the
second test should not be difficult to pass. Id. at 75 n.20 (" 'substantial likelihood' that the relief
requested will redress the injury claimed" is all that is required).
118. 5 U.S.C. §§ 1501-1508 (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
119. See pp. 1702-03 supra.
120. 5 U.S.C. § 1502 (1976).
121. Oklahoma v. United States Civil Serv. Comm'n, 330 U.S. 127 (1947). As Justice Hans
Linde has pointed out, the logic of Oklahoma allows Congress to prevent a state from having an
elected Highway Commission, and would presumably allow any congressional regulation of the selec-
tion of officials administering programs aided by national funds. Linde, Justice Douglas on Freedom
in the Welfare State, 39 WASH. L. REV. 4, 30 (1964).
122. See p. 1706 & note 73 supra.
123. 40 U.S.C.A. § 461 (West Supp. 1981) (community land use plans); 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 1451-
1464 (West 1974 & Supp. 1981) (coastal zone management).
124. 44 Fed. Reg. 54,432 (1979) (codified at 24 C.F.R. § 600.55). The Department announced
that activities that did not further national policy objectives would not receive future funding. 24
C.F.R. § 600.55(a) (1980).
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Secretary of Commerce. 2 '
Conditions attached to national highway grants impinge on the states'
Type II power to exercise their coercive force 12 by requiring that states
adopt and enforce a uniform maximum speed limit of fifty-five miles an
hour. 1 27 States must adopt laws or administrative regulations that punish
those who violate this speed limit21 and must certify that they are enforc-
ing those laws.
1 29
All of the above conditions impinge on exclusive state powers. For that
reason, state acceptance of them and the grants attached to them fails to
meet the requirement of uninfluenced decisionmaking.
Conclusion
Applying a requirement of uninfluenced decisionmaking to the states
would achieve the Federalist goals, implicit in our Constitution, that are
inadequately protected by the present coercion analysis. Coercion analysis
ignores the Federalism problems that occur when states voluntarily allow
the national government to influence their policymaking, and is thus un-
workable. If Federalism is to be taken seriously, the adoption of the doc-
trine of uninfluenced decisionmaking is necessary: no other doctrine pro-
vides a coherent explanation for preventing national intrusion into state
realms while remaining consistent with the accepted post-1937 under-
standing of the extent of the national government's power. The shift of
analysis from the limits of national power to the extent of exclusive state
powers, brought about by the New Deal, makes this doctrine the most
logical way of approaching the problems of Federalism implicit in condi-
tional grants to state governments. Only a constitutional requirement of
uninfluenced decisionmaking on matters of exclusive state power addresses
the central issue involved: what limits should be placed upon the transfer
of exclusive state powers by the states to the national government.
125. 16 U.S.C.A. § 1455 (West 1974 & Supp. 1981).
126. See p. 1708 supra.
127. 23 U.S.C. § 154 (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
128. 45 Fed. Reg. 64491 (1980) (to be codified at 23 C.F.R. § 659).
129. 23 U.S.C. § 141 (Supp. III 1979); 45 Fed. Reg. 64491, 66492 (1980) (to be codified at 23
C.F.R. § 659.13).
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